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This paper explores the use of model organisms in studying the cognitive 
phenomenon of decision-making. Drawing on the framework of biological control 
to develop a skeletal conception of decision-making, we show that two core features 
of decision-making mechanisms can be identified by studying model organisms, such 
as E. coli, jellyfish, C. elegans, lamprey, etc. First, decision mechanisms are 
distributed and heterarchically-structured. Second, they depend heavily on chemical 
information processing, such as those involving neuromodulators. We end by 
discussing the implications for studying distinctively human decision-making.       
 
 




Cognitive science has studied cognitive processes such as decision-making principally in humans. This practice 
differs radically from those found in biology where researchers commonly study phenomena of interest in model 
organisms. One reason for the difference might be that only one species exhibits the phenomenon. That is the case 
for some cognitive activities, such as language use. But other cognitive activities, including decision-making, are 
performed by many, if not all living organisms. In this paper we explore what would be gained if cognitive science 
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and other disciplines interested in cognition, including philosophy, adopted the practice of biologists and looked to 
model organisms.  
Philosophers of science have begun the task of characterizing the use of model organisms in biology, addressing such 
issues as the importance of similarity of model organisms to the explanatory target of the research (Weber 2005, 
chapter 6; Weisberg 2013; Levy and Currie 2014; Ankeny and Leonelli 2020).1 There is one objective of model-
organism research that has not been emphasized so far: the quest to identify less complicated organisms in which the 
phenomenon of interest can still be identified so as to reveal the core features of the relevant mechanisms. This is the 
motivation for the recent interest in studying sleep not just in fruit flies, but also in jellyfish and worms. Our objective 
is to investigate the potential benefits of adopting this strategy of investigating less complicated organisms in studying 
cognitive phenomena, such as decision-making.  
We start with decision-making in organisms without neurons. Although many think neurons are essential in any 
organism capable of making decisions, biologists studying behavior in both bacteria and plants describe them as making 
decisions and have made considerable progress in characterizing the relevant mechanisms. In section 2, we provide 
one example of decision-making in bacteria and use that in section 3 to motivate a general conceptual framing of 
decision-making in terms of control mechanisms. In section 4, we turn to decision-making in invertebrates, including 
jellyfish, worms, and leeches, in which (1) a host of distributed mechanisms have been identified, and (2) chemicals 
that function as neuromodulators play important roles. In section 5, we consider two vertebrate model organisms, 
the lamprey and the cat. Together these model organisms point to a subcortical structure, the basal ganglia, as critical 
to much decision-making in vertebrates, including us. In the conclusion, we consider what might be differences 
between human decision-making and that found in these different model organisms and how these differences might 
be bridged.   
2. Model Organisms that Make Decisions Without Neurons  
Biologists studying bacteria have identified many alternative behaviors that bacteria can choose upon evaluation of 
internal and external conditions. For example, the decision to form fruiting bodies and produce spores in Myxococcus 
xanthus requires the collaboration of other bacteria and is only appropriate under specific conditions (Muñoz-Dorado 
et al. 2016). 
Here, we focus on one well-known activity performed in individual bacteria— the selection of locomotion direction 
in E. coli. E. coli moves using flagella controlled by a motor that rotates either counterclockwise (projecting the 
bacterium forward) or clockwise (allowing it to tumble and thereby orient in a different direction). To select between 
these behaviors, E. coli relies on five types of transmembrane proteins located at one pole. They detect the 
concentration of various chemicals and the intracellular energy status and initiate a process that phosphorylates or 
dephosphorylates the chemotaxis protein CheY. CheY then binds to the motor and determines its direction of rotation 
(Falke and Piasta 2014). These transmembrane proteins are modified in relation to previous responses in order to 
evaluate whether the concentration of attractants and repellants is increasing or decreasing.  
The reason biologists refer to this activity as decision-making is that it includes an evaluation process—the bacterium 
receives stimuli about multiple nutrients and toxins and must select just one action. Although relatively simple, these 
transmembrane proteins are highly adaptive, not just adapting to stimuli over five orders of magnitude and past 
interactions, but adjusting its responses in relation to the presence of other bacteria by altering the number of different 
receptors (Sourjik and Wingreen 2012). The mechanism also allows for individual differences—with differing 
numbers of each type of receptor, individual bacteria make different decisions whether to move forward or tumble. 
 
1 There are important differences between these accounts about whether model organisms function like other models (theoretical and 
computational), what organisms should be counted as model organisms, and whether there are specific repertoires associated with different 
model organisms. For the purposes of this paper, we do not need to take a stance of these issues. 
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3. Decision-Making and Control Mechanisms 
One reason many theorists resist applying cognitive vocabulary to simpler organisms, especially those without 
neurons, is that their behavior is thought to be just the product of reflexes. Yet, many microbiologists treat the 
selection of locomotion in E. coli as a decision-making process. Part of the reason is that alternative actions are available 
for the bacterium to select. But it is not enough that the organism selects randomly. Decision-making requires the 
organism to evaluate alternatives and select between them based on the information collected. This is what control 
mechanisms do: they draw upon measurements, evaluate them, and act upon evaluations by selecting between 
alternatives. This characterization of control provides a skeletal perspective on decision-making, one that makes clear 
why even organisms without neurons are productively characterized as making decisions. 
The various activities of living systems—metabolism, growth, locomotion, reproduction, etc.—are performed by 
production mechanisms. The new mechanists have described how scientists in the life sciences develop explanations 
by identifying the production mechanism responsible for a given phenomenon and decomposing it into its parts, 
operations, and organization (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005). They have, 
however, largely failed to consider the mechanisms as situated in organisms (for an exception, see Bechtel 2019). As 
emphasized by philosophers who have focused on the autonomy of living organisms (Moreno and Mossio 2015), 
biological mechanisms must be built and maintained by an organism (through the operation of other mechanisms). 
That is, biological mechanisms must exhibit organizational closure, in which “not only the very existence and activity of 
the constituents [mechanisms] depend on the network of processes of transformation that they realize but, in addition, 
they collectively promote the conditions of their own existence through their interaction with the environment.” 
(Bich 2018, 125; see also Varela 1979). Here we focus on the second requirement—that production mechanisms 
serve to maintain the organism. For them to do this, the organisms must control and coordinate production 
mechanisms so that they function in ways appropriate given the organism’s internal state and environmental 
conditions. Otherwise, these mechanisms will operate whenever their start-up conditions are realized, whether doing 
so benefits or harms the organism. Therefore, control mechanisms must (1) collect information about external and 
internal conditions to evaluate the appropriate operations of the production mechanisms and (2) on the basis of the 
evaluation, modify these mechanism’s flexible parts and activities.  
To understand the uniqueness of biological control mechanisms, it helps to contrast them with human-made control 
mechanisms. A thermostat, for example, measures the temperature and sends a command to the furnace to alter its 
functioning. The thermostat performs an evaluation: are the input conditions appropriate for turning on the furnace? 
The thermostat, however, is not part of an autonomous system that produces and maintains it, and whose existence 
is affected by the operations of this mechanism. Moreover, it is under the control of the external human user who sets 
the desired temperature. In an autonomous biological system, in contrast, the decision made by a control mechanism 
affects the existence of the system that harbors it; in turn, the target state of the control mechanism is set collectively 
by the components of the system. Given the importance of appropriately controlling production mechanisms to keep 
the organism alive, it is not surprising that every organism has assembled an enormous number of control mechanisms 
over its evolution. Typically, as we emphasize below, these are not organized hierarchically, as in many human-
designed control systems, but heterarchically (McCulloch 1945; Pattee 1991; Winning and Bechtel 2018).  
In section 2, we offered just one example of decision-making in bacteria; there are a host of others that could flesh 
out the skeletal account of decision-making. However, we turn to considering how organisms with neurons use them 
to make decisions.  
 
4. Model Invertebrate Animals that Make Decisions Using Neurons 
When cognitive scientists describe decision-making mechanisms, they describe neural systems in the brain. 
Neurons, however, figure in decision-making in organisms without a centralized brain, and these organisms too 
provide productive model organisms. In this section, we briefly introduce three invertebrate model organisms in 
which to study decision-making. Studying these model organisms brings to light two features of decision mechanisms 
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often ignored in the studies of human decision-making: its distributed, heterarchical structure and its significant 
reliance on neuromodulators.     
We start with jellyfish, members of the phylum of Cnidarians, which many biologists view as reflective of organisms 
with neurons before the evolution of bilateral organisms. A distinctive feature of jellyfish is the occurrence of a 
network of sensory and ganglion neurons situated next to contractile epithelial cells constituting the bell. These have 
been characterized as constituting the skin brain (Holland 2003; Keijzer, van Duijn, and Lyon 2013), which controls 
coordinated contractions required for swimming. The activity in the skin brain is, in turn, controlled by inner ring 
neurons around the bell, which serve to generate a coherent rhythm. Although the skin brain and inner ring neurons 
already play control roles, their role is primarily to coordinate patterns of activity in contractile tissue. As with pattern 
generators in bilateral organisms, alternative behaviors are generated by other control mechanisms operating on them. 
Thus, to identify decision-making in jellyfish, we need to focus on how pattern-generating neurons respond to neural 
inputs that provide information elicited from sensors. 
In Aglantha digitale, fourteen distinct neural control mechanisms have been identified as providing inputs on the basis 
of which the jellyfish decides which behavior to pursue by modulating the operations of the inner ring neurons (Mackie 
2004; Satterlie 2018). Aglantha has the capacity to generate two distinct modes of swimming, slow and escape. Slow 
swimming relies on the default operation of the inner ring and skin brain neurons. Escape swimming, involving 
stronger muscle contractions, is initiated by neural signals from the tentacles. But this is not the only input that alters 
behavior. When eating, Aglantha briefly inhibits swimming. Mackie, Meech, and Spencer (2012) investigated this 
circuitry in another Cnidarian species, Polyorchis penicillatus, and established that when food is encountered, an 
electrical pulse is transmitted along a nerve plexus that inhibits the pacemaker ring neurons. Moreover, this was only 
one of four circuits that sufficed to inhibit swimming, each of which figures in different decisions. As this case 
illustrates, the decision-making mechanisms form a distributed, heterarchical structure, instead of a neat hierarchical 
structure of sensation-cognition-action often assumed in human studies.   
Moreover, when researchers study decision mechanisms, they often view them as electrical systems—electrical 
pulses are transmitted along dendrites and axons, with chemical transmitters limited to the synapse. But in fact, 
neurons in all animals, including jellyfish, also employ neuropeptides and volume transmitters (e.g., dopamine and 
serotonin) that are released by neurons and other cells and diffuse through the organism, affecting other neurons that 
have receptors for them. These chemicals often function as neuromodulators that radically transform the decision 
made by a given neural circuit. This is well illustrated in the nematode worm C. elegans, the only organism for which 
we have a nearly complete map of all of its neurons and their connectivity (White et al. 1986; for a more recent 
update, see Varshney et al. 2011). This has rendered C. elegans a model organism for determining circuits involved in 
making decisions about different behaviors.  
The circuitry alone is insufficient to understand decisions, as circuits generate different responses depending on 
which neuromodulators (registering different conditions in the organism) are present. For example, as shown in 
Figure 1, ASH generates repulsion through a chemical synapse to AVA, a command interneuron. However, ASH as 
well as four other neurons can, through gap junctions with another command interneuron, RMG, generate repulsion 
when RMG is inhibited by the neuropeptide receptor NRP-1. Bargmann (2012) concludes from this and other findings 
that “information flow through C. elegans circuits depends on neuromodulatory states” (p. 461).  
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Figure 1. Circuit in C. elegans in which whether ASH generates repulsion or aggregation is modulated 
by the action of neuropeptide receptor NPR-1 on interneuron RMG. 
 
Finally, another invertebrate organism employed to study decision-making is the medicinal leech (Hirudo verbena), 
which must decide between two modes of locomotion, swimming or crawling. This decision is not made in a 
centralized brain, but by 21 individual ganglia along its body, each containing approximately 400 neurons. The overall 
choice of the leech results from the interaction of these distributed ganglia, not through any centralized command. 
To study how each ganglion decides, Briggman, Abarbanel, and Kristan (2005) employed sensory stimuli that were 
equally likely to elicit either response and recorded from neurons in an exposed ganglion. They determined that 
decisions arose through a dynamical interaction between a subset of these neurons that gave rise to attractor 
dynamics—once spontaneous activity fell into the attractor for one activity, it would activate the pattern generator 
for that activity. Yet, as in C. elegans, neuromodulators, such as serotonin and dopamine synthesized by other control 
mechanisms, influence the probability of each behavior, with serotonin increasing the likelihood of swimming and 
dopamine of crawling (Puhl and Mesce 2008; Crisp and Mesce 2006). The decision circuitry is also altered by activities 
such as feeding, which blocks sensory circuits from sending inputs to the decision system, resulting in the leech 
remaining stationary (Gaudry and Kristan 2009).    
We have briefly introduced three invertebrates that use neurons in making decisions. Each provides insights into 
the types of mechanisms employed in animal decision-making. Together they reveal decision-making mechanisms that 
are highly distributed. Moreover, while the wiring of these circuits is suggestive of how they process information, the 
actual functioning of the circuits is modulated by chemical signals that encode information about the state of the 
organism and the environment.  
5. Vertebrate Model Organisms for Decision-Making  
One might assume that while decision-making is highly distributed and modulated by chemical signals in invertebrates, 
it is taken over by the central brain in vertebrates, and indeed by the most distinctive part of the human brain, the 
cerebral cortex. While the cerebral cortex does play a critical role in encoding information relevant to human 
decision-making, it is only one component in a much larger, distributed and heterarchically-organized system. For 
example, the hypothalamus, relying heavily on signaling involving peptides and amines, plays a crucial role in many 
decisions related to ubiquitous animal activities such as eating, sleeping, and reproducing. Here we focus on the basal 
ganglia, a network of subcortical ganglia, to demonstrate how the two features identified in invertebrate decision 
mechanisms, distributed processing and chemical modulation, remain relevant in other vertebrate decision-making.    
The lamprey, which is phylogenetically the most distant vertebrate from humans, is a model organism that has 
provided important insights into the mammalian nervous system. The lamprey and humans share the same basic neural 
architecture (Stephenson-Jones et al. 2012). Although lacking a cerebral cortex, the lamprey does contain a small 
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pallium, a region that expanded over phylogeny to give rise to the mammalian neocortex, hippocampus, and 
amygdala. An important feature, found in the lamprey and preserved in all vertebrates, are neuronal loops between 
the pallium, thalamus, and basal ganglia.  
The architecture of the basal ganglia is fundamentally the same in all vertebrates (Figure 2), although the vocabulary 
used to designate the different nuclei varies. The striatum constitutes the input region. It receives inputs from multiple 
brain regions, including not only the pallium/neocortex but also mesencephalic and diencephalic locomotor regions 
(MLR/DLR) that sequence commands sent to central pattern generators in the brainstem and spinal cord to enable 
locomotion. The substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNr) and the globus pallidus internus (GPi) constitute the output regions. 
By default, neurons in these areas send inhibitory signals to their targets, including the same areas from which the 
input was received, giving rise to the loops on which we focus. Whether the output back to the originating areas is 
actually inhibitory is determined by two pathways between the striatum and the output regions. The indirect pathway, 
in which the globus pallidus externa (GPe) and the subthalamic nucleus (STN) serve as intermediates, acts to enhance the 
inhibition. In contrast, activity along the direct pathway inhibits the output regions, thereby reducing their inhibitory 
effect. Adjacent regions in the pallium/neocortex and in the MLR/DLR project to adjacent regions in the striatum 
and give rise to a competition between nearby direct or indirect pathways, selecting one target for reduced inhibition.  
As a result of the loops back to the regions from which inputs originated, the basal ganglia serve to allow some 
processing to continue while processing in nearby areas is suppressed. The basal ganglia thus are involved in the activity 
of evaluating and selecting between alternatives—making decisions. The architecture of the basal ganglia, however, 
suggests it is only one part of a distributed decision system. It lacks the computational resources to itself evaluate 
different options. Rather, the striatum receives evaluative signals for competing options from across the brain. 
Through the two pathways, the basal ganglia facilitate competition between the alternatives so that one of the 
competitors is evaluated most positively (Ashby, Turner, and Horvitz 2010). The basal ganglia are thus one 
component in a distributed, heterarchical decision-making system. 
 
Figure 2. Major structures and pathways involving the basal ganglia. See text for details. 
 
The importance of the basal ganglia in decision-making is illustrated by the results of mid-20th century research on 
decorticate cats (cats in which projections from the cortex and other brain areas to motor control areas are destroyed). 
If both the basal ganglia and cortex were cut off from lower brain areas, the cats could still perform individual 
behaviors when elicited by appropriate electrical stimulation, but they could not initiate the actions in response to 
their current contexts. When the basal ganglia were also spared, decerebrate cats performed many locomotor and 
other behaviors of ordinary cats (Bard and Macht 1958; Whelan 1996). They ate and drank, responded to stimuli, 
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groomed themselves, moved about in their environment, and made the decisions necessary to maintain themselves in 
the relatively protected environment of the laboratory. In these animals the evaluations were presumably provided by 
the motor command areas or other areas such as the thalamus which initiated competition in the basal ganglia that 
resulted in making decisions.   
As in the invertebrate examples, neuromodulators affect decision-making in the basal ganglia. For example, 
dopamine plays a critical role. Synthesized by neurons originating in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and the substantia 
nigra pars compactus (SNc), it diffuses broadly to bind different types of receptors on striatal neurons projecting along 
the direct and indirect pathways. Higher-levels of tonic dopamine up-regulate the striatal neurons in the direct 
pathway while down-regulating those in the indirect pathway, shifting the balance of explorative vs. exploitative 
behaviors towards exploitation (and vice versa) (Hills et al. 2015). Dopamine is also thought to function as a reward 
prediction error signal in reinforcement learning, which enables the organism to learn to select the best action, on 
average, for a given context. Finally, reduced dopamine level in Parkinson’s patients contributes to disabilities in 
decision-making in both motor and more cognitive domains, such as maintaining and updating working memory 
(Ashby, Turner, and Horvitz 2010).   
In short, even when we turn to decision-making in vertebrates, we find model organisms, such as the lamprey and 
the cat, to be instructive in investigating decision-making. An important insight they provide is that a subcortical 
structure, the basal ganglia, figures importantly in decision-making, but doing so as part of distributed decision-making 
mechanisms and significantly implicating neuromodulators.  
6. Conclusion: Model Organisms for Studying Decision-Making in Cognitive Science? 
At the outset, we contrasted cognitive science with biological disciplines in not studying phenomena such as 
decision-making more extensively in model organisms. Part of the motivation for using model organisms is that they 
offer simpler versions of the mechanism responsible for a phenomenon. We have offered a few examples of such 
organisms and discussed insights they can provide for understanding decision-making. A point not yet emphasized in 
the model organism literature in philosophy is that researchers also expect differences between model organisms and 
the target organism. Indeed, there is at least one glaring difference between decision-making in the model organisms 
we discussed and in humans: some human decisions involve conscious representation and evaluation of alternatives, 
including elaborate reasoning about the alternatives. Some may see this difference as so significant that it negates any 
value of looking to model organisms to study decision-making. We conclude with some considerations as to why, 
despite this difference, studying decision-making in model organisms is still useful. 
A first consideration is that there are a host of decisions humans make every day that do not involve conscious 
deliberation. These decisions affect much of our behavior. By conceiving decision-making within the context of 
control mechanisms, we can recognize that other organisms make these decisions as well, and how they do so may 
provide insights into how we make these decisions. Further, how model organisms make these decisions may also 
offer insights into our conscious decision-making. One distinctive feature of conscious human decision-making is that 
we sometimes make decisions based on explicitly represented evaluative norms. Moreover, we take these norms to 
be ones we choose. How do these norms operate? Decision-making, even in bacteria and invertebrate animals, relies 
on evaluative norms such as preference between different sources of nutrients, or between repellants and attractants. 
These norms are embodied in the organization of the decision-making mechanisms—e.g., the type and number of 
receptors in bacteria and the circuitry, electrical and chemical, in C. elegans. Likewise, our consciously selected norms 
may be realized in the organization of the decision-making mechanisms operative in us. They may include loops 
between frontal regions of the neocortex, thought to be critical for the neural processing involving in high-level 
reasoning, and the basal ganglia. Moreover, model organisms may provide insights into the processes through which 
we select norms—it may depend on the same type of chemical, highly-distributed, heterarchically-organized decision 
mechanisms found in model organisms. That is, in selecting evaluative norms for ourselves, we may rely on those 
already embodied in us as a result of evolution and development. These possibilities suggest ways in which model 
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